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BARNES- WALLACE V CITY OF SAN DIEGO:
"PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY' AND ITS
EFFECT ON STANDING
ANDREW MEYER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Presbyterian Church, would, I should think, exclude me from
employment as a minister, because I am Jewish, but if they
managed a recreational facility open to all without discrimination as
the Boy Scouts do, their ministry exclusion would not give me
standing to challenge their park management contract. Exclusion
from something else entirely, employment as a minister, does not
confer standing to challenge any relationship the government has
with an organization.'
The above hypothetical situation is similar to the facts of
Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego. In that case, the plaintiffs
incurred a psychological injury-revulsion-as a result of the
exclusionary policies of the Boy Scouts. 2 But, as Justice Kleinfeld
states in his dissent, this revulsion should have no bearing on
standing to challenge the Boy Scouts' leases with the City of San
Diego. 3 In contrast, the majority holds that this offense is a
4
sufficient "injury-in-fact" to confer standing on the plaintiffs.
Part II of this Comment will examine the history of standing
doctrine, from English and early American jurisprudence to the
present day law on standing. It will also examine Supreme Court
precedent concerning psychological injury, as well as the facts and
issues presented in the recent Ninth Circuit court case, BarnesWallace v. City of San Diego. Part III of this Comment will
examine the reasoning of the majority in Barnes-Wallace in
rejecting the precedent as well as analyze why it should have
controlled. It will also discuss the effects this decision has already
had and the future effects on standing requirements. Part IV will

* J.D., summa cum laude, May 2011. The author obtained a Bachelor of

Arts degree in Criminal Justice Sciences from Illinois State University before
obtaining his Juris Doctor from The John Marshall Law School.
1. Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 797 n.27 (9th Cir.
2008) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (providing an example as to why standing
should not be granted to the plaintiffs in the case).
2. Id. at 784 (majority opinion).
3. Id. at 797 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 785 (majority opinion).
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propose that the Supreme Court must sort out the confusion
surrounding standing by granting certiorari to make clear that
psychological injury will not be sufficient to confer standing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin and Roots of Standing
There is much debate concerning whether standing or "injuryin-fact" has historical roots.5 According to some commentators,
there was no separate doctrine of standing or requirement of an
"injury-in-fact" from the founding era to near 1920.6 One example
5. The debate centers on whether standing has been required for centuries
or whether it is a modern innovation of the Supreme Court. See Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300-01 (suggesting that
standing may have some historical connections, although they are loose
connections at best); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat
Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (2004) (arguing that
standing is not a modern innovation but rather has roots dating back to
eighteenth and nineteenth century courts); Mark Wankum, Comment,
Standing in the Way of Clarity: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc., 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 515, 521-25 (2008) (discussing standing's
evolution from colonial times to the modern day approach); but see Daniel A.
Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1543-46
(2008) (arguing that neither historical evidence nor the Constitution supports
the modern standing requirements); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163 (1992) (providing an in-depth review of the history of the courts and
why the modern standing requirements, especially "injury-in-fact," cannot be
reconciled with the text of the Constitution or historical evidence); compare
Sunstein, supra, at 169 (stating that the "explosion of judicial interest in
standing as a distinct body of constitutional law is an extraordinarily recent
phenomenon."), with Woolhandler & Nelson, supra, at 691 (stating that there
was "an active law of standing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.").
Of course, the term "standing" was not used very much by early American
courts, but this, in itself, does not mean that the concept did not exist.
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra, at 691.
6. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 170. During this period, it was widely
believed that the Constitution did not limit Congress' power to confer a cause
of action to citizens. Id. Instead of considering whether a plaintiff had an
"injury-in-fact," courts asked whether Congress or another source of law, such
as the common law, granted the plaintiff the right to sue. Id.; see also Craig A.
Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a
Constitutionalor a PrudentialTest for Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEwIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2008) (claiming that the question of whether a
party had standing to sue for most of American history was whether the party
could show that it had a cause of action); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395
(1988) (explaining that "[w]hat a court looked for was whether the matter
before it fit one of the recognized forms of action"); see also Lawrence D.
Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a Just
Mechanism for WTO Resolution, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 537 (stating that the
right to bring suit has ensured that the parties in the American common law
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of not requiring a plaintiff to have suffered a personal "injury-infact" in order to bring suit was the early creation by Congress of
qui tam actions.7 These actions were well-known in American
jurisprudence well before 1920.8 Qui tam literally translates to
"who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter."
Under this type of action, a strangero who had not suffered any
particular injury (injury-in-fact) was legally able to bring suit
against an offender of the law. Today, this type of action is
commonly known as a "citizen suit." Over the years, the doctrine of
standing has evolved the most in relation to this type of suit."
In contrast, other commentators argue that the standing
requirements are not mandated precursors to bring a lawsuit
because the text of Article 11112 does not require a plaintiff to show
system have proper incentives to pursue litigation).
7. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 175. The purpose was to help in the
enforcement of the federal criminal laws. Id.; Francisco Benzoni,
Environmental Standing: Who Determines the Value of Other Life, 18 DUKE
ENVTL. & POL'Y F. 347, 368 (2008) (stating that the purpose of the qui tam
action was to give citizens the right to bring civil suits against those that
violated the criminal law). A few examples included actions surrounding the
import of liquor without paying the duties owed on it and trading slaves with
foreign nations. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 175.
8. "Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself has
no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have
been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country ever
since the foundation of our Government." Sunstein, supra note 5, at 175
(quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943).
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004). Qui tam is the shortened
form of the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur. Id. A qui tam action is "an action brought under a statute that
allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or
some specified public institution will receive." Id.
10. "One who is not party to a given transaction; esp., someone other than
a party or the party's employee, agent, tenant, or immediate family member."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 1461; see also Winter, supra note 6,
at 1409 (claiming that constitutional problems under Article III were not
raised when those who had not suffered any personal injury themselves
[strangers] brought suit on behalf of the public).
11. Along with "taxpayer suits," citizen suits are considered generalized
grievances that are shared by a large class of citizens, if not all of them.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.5
at 90-91 (3d ed. 2006). Generalized grievances usually deal with the situation
of an individual bringing suit, but the only injury is that the government
should follow the law. Id. at 91.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. This clause states,
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the same
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an injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.1a There is another
school of thought postulating that the concept of standing was
alive in the courts of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 14 The
concept of standing, to these commentators, has its roots in the
distinction between public and private rights. 15 For the most part,
these rights were separate, meaning that an individual could
assert his own private rights, but the public could not assert the
individual's private rights on his behalf.'6 In the context of
criminal prosecutions, the rights that were vindicated by the
prosecution against criminal behavior were thought to be public
rights and not those of the private victim,' 7 although the victim
may be a witness for the prosecution.' 8 This concept of public
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. The three present-day constitutional requirements of standing, however,
are supposedly implicit in the "Case" or "Controversy" language of Article III.
E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) ("This
triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of
Article III's case-or-controversy requirement. . . .").
13. Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for PrudentialStanding, 39 U. MEM. L. REV.
727, 733 (2009).
14. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 5, at 691.
15. Id. at 692. Public rights were rights that belonged to the public in its
aggregate as a community. Id. at 693 (citing Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21
(N.Y. 1829) (contrasting the "public rights belonging to the people at large"
and "the private unalienable rights of each individual") (emphasis omitted)). A
few examples of public rights that were generally shared were passage on
public highways and the free navigation of waterways. Woolhandler & Nelson,
supra note 5, at 693 (citing Smith, 4 Wend. at 21 ("The right to navigate the
public waters of the State and to fish therein, and the right to use the public
highways . . . belong[] to the people at large."). In contrast, private rights were
held by individuals. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 5, at 693. A few
examples of private rights included an individual's rights in enforcing
contracts, in property, and in one's own body. Id.
16. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 5, at 695 ("Americans of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were used to distinguishing between
wrongs to private individuals and wrongs to the public at large."). The
criminal law and the ability of government to seek criminal punishment are
core examples of public rights. Id. at 696 (noting that, although crimes
impacted private rights, "criminal law enforcement was conceptualized as
vindicating a shared public interest . . . ."). Many times, the rights of the

public as well as an individual's private rights were violated as a result of
criminal behavior. Id. Because both the rights of the public at large and the
private rights of an individual were possibly affected by the same criminal
behavior, it could potentially give rise to two different actions - the public's
action for punishment of the criminal behavior and the individual's action for
compensation from the criminal behavior. Id.
17. Id. at 697 (citing Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601, 603 (Pa. 1809)
(Tilghman, C.J.) ("the proceeding by indictment is not the right of the injured
party, but of the public.") (emphasis omitted)).
18. See State v. Rickey, 10 N.J.L. 83, 84 (1828) (holding that although a
people who are the victim of a crime (robbery, for example) may be "interested
in the transactions themselves, he [sic] can have no interest in the public
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versus private rights was linked to the need to have proper parties
before the court to exercise their respective rights, which is seen
by this commentator to be the beginning of standing.'9 Despite the
debate over standing's historical roots, standing jurisprudence has
continued to evolve.
B. Standing from the "New Deal" Era to the Present Day
Although commentators disagree as to whether standing has
historical background, most seem to agree that implied
constitutional standing requirements began to emerge after the
1920s. 20 The emergence and subsequent changes in standing are
often discussed in relation to taxpayer suits and citizen suits. 21
One of the first cases to address an issue resembling modern
standing was Frothingham v. Mellon.22 Frothingham challenged
the constitutionality of a federal act known as the Maternity Act,
which appropriated federal tax money to only those states that
chose to comply with its provisions. 23 Frothingham challenged the
statute as a taxpayer on the basis that it was unconstitutional and
2
would increase her tax burden, both presently and in the future. 4
The Court held that Frothingham had not suffered any direct
injury outside her interest in her money in the federal treasury. 25
The Court went on to hold that a taxpayer's interest in the moneys
of the federal treasury was so "minute and indeterminable" and
the effect was so "remote, fluctuating and uncertain" that there
was no basis for the Court to afford relief.26
prosecution.").
19. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 5, at 691.
20. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Jusidicary: InstitutionalizingJudicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1009
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 179; Wankum,
supra note 5, at 523.
21. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 91; Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 20,
at 1009-10; Wankum, supra note 5, at 523.
22. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
23. Id. at 479. The Maternity Act was passed in 1921 and essentially
provided appropriations to states that chose to comply with its provisions. Id.;
Wankum, supra note 5, at 527. The purpose of the act was to "co-operate" with
the states to reduce the mortality rates of infants and mothers and generally
protect their health. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 479; Wankum, supra note 5, at
527.
24. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 486; Wankum, supra note 5, at 527.
25. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487; Wankum, supra note 5, at 527. The
Court stated that it had "no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress
on the ground that they are unconstitutional." Frothingham,262 U.S. at 488.
The Court went on to hold that, without a direct injury, they could not pass
judgment on the constitutionality of an act of Congress or they would
essentially "assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and coequal department ... ." Id.
26. Id. at 487. The Court contrasted this situation with that of a taxpayer
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A similar reasoning concerning citizen suits was applied by
the Court in Ex parte Levitt. 27 At that point, it seemed clear that
taxpayer and citizen suits were constitutionally barred due to a
lack of personalized injury. 28 It was also during that time period
that justices began linking the requirements of "standing" to
Article III and our common law history in order to insulate
Progressive and New Deal legislation from invalidation.2 9
Later on, most notably in the era of Chief Justice Earl
Warren,3 0 there was liberalization in the standing movement. 3' A
major deviation from prior thoughts of standing occurred in Flast
v. Cohen.32 In Flast, the plaintiffs (taxpayers) complained that the
challenging the use of his money by a municipality. Id. at 486. In the situation
of a municipality and the monies paid into it through taxes, the Court found
that the application of the taxpayer's money had a direct and immediate effect
on the taxpayer, and it was appropriate to prevent the misuse of one's tax
money by seeking an injunction. Id.
27. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (holding that a private
individual must show a direct injury, or immediate threat of injury, as a result
of the action and that having "a general interest common to all members of the
public" is not sufficient). In the case, the plaintiff was filing suit to challenge
the appointment of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court, alleging that the
appointment was void. Id. at 635-36. The plaintiff alleged that Black was
ineligible under Article I, section 6, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Id.; see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 92 (explaining that the plaintiff alleged that
Black was ineligible because, as a Senator, Black had voted to increase the
retirement benefits of Supreme Court justices and this violated Article I,
section 6, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution).
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 92.
29. Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The
Original Understanding,63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1001-02 (1997); Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 179-80; Wankum, supra note 5, at 523; see, e.g., Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a court should not decide an issue unless "the
nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the
relationship between the parties are such that judicial determination is
consonant ... with what was the business of the Colonial courts of
Westminster when the Constitution was framed.").
30. Earl Warren was nominated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in
1953 to become the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after losing the
nomination for president to Eisenhower. The Oyez Project, Justice Earl
Warren, http://www.oyez.org/justices/earl_warren (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
Earl Warren served as Chief Justice from 1953 until he retired from the Court
in 1969. Id.
31. See Wankum, supra note 5, at 524 (explaining that the categories of
injuries that would meet the standing requirements were expanded to allow
many people affected by the decisions of the government to challenge the
government); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 91 (stating that the
Warren Court expanded the standing of taxpayers).
32. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see also Brian G. Gilmore, Warth
Redux: The Making of Warth v. Seldin, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 147,
166-68 (2009) (discussing Flast as providing a foundation for Article III
standing); Wankum, supra note 5, at 531-36 (discussing the different opinions
of the justices and their reasoning).
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Elementary and Secondary School Act 33 violated the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 34 of the First
Amendment.35 This act used federal funds that were appropriated
to finance instruction in several subjects in religious schools.36 In
effect, the plaintiffs were challenging a federal statute on the same
basis as those in Frothingham, as taxpayers.37 Chief Justice
Warren, however, set aside the constitutional implications of
earlier decisions and held that barring taxpayer suits was merely
a prudential rule-those rules put forth that are based not on the
Constitution, but on prudent judicial administration, such as
efficient and economic case administration. 38 The Chief Justice
established a two-part test in deciding whether a party had
standing as a taxpayer, thereby granting standing to taxpayers
under certain circumstances, where before there was no such
possibility.39
Additionally, the Court developed a "legal wrong" or "legal
interest" test.40 This type of test allowed many people intended to
be benefitted by certain statutory enactments but affected in a
negative way to bring challenges against the government. 41 This
33. The Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 allowed the federal
government to provide funds for instruction in secular subjects in parochial
schools. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 92.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the Free Exercise thereof . . .
35. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
36. Id. at 85-86.
37. Id. at 91-93.
38. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 63. One example of a prudential
standing requirement is that a party cannot raise the claims of third parties
before the court, but may raise only its own claims. Id.; see also Flast, 392 U.S.
at 101 (stating that standing requires that a plaintiff have a personal stake in
the outcome).
39. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03. First, the party bringing suit had to show a
logical link between his status as a taxpayer and the type of legislation he is
attacking. Id. at 102. In essence, this meant that a taxpayer could challenge
only the expenditure of funds under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the
Constitution because those provisions exclusively relied on tax monies.
Wankum, supra note 5, at 533. Second, the taxpayer has to establish "a nexus
between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged." Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. This means that a taxpayer must assert that
Congress is violating a particular provision of the Constitution with the
expenditure (such as the Establishment Clause) and not just that Congress
has exceeded the scope of its powers granted by the Constitution. Wankum,
supra note 5, at 533-34.
40. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 184; Wankum, supra note 5, at 524. A
plaintiff could show that he had suffered a "legal wrong" because a common
law interest had been violated, such as an interest in property. Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 181. Additionally, under the Administrative Procedure Act,
the "mere existence of an interest protected by statute was sufficient" to confer
standing. Id. at 182.
41. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 184; Wankum, supra note 5, at 524.
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test is often thought to have gone hand-in-hand with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),42 which was an attempt to
codify the body of judge-made standing law. 43
Nevertheless, just as Chief Justice Warren was replaced by
Chief Justice Burger, 44 so too was the "legal wrong" test replaced. 45
The Burger Court replaced the "legal interest" test with an
"injury-in-fact" test.46 This change was believed to allow for a
broader range of challenges to government regulation because
plaintiffs were no longer required to base their claim on a "legal
interest."47 This revolution in requiring an injury-in-fact instead of
a legal interest has remained with the Court to the present day
and is alive in the modern test.48
C. Modern Standing Requirements: The Tripartite Test
Presently, the Supreme Court has enunciated several
requirements for standing a plaintiff must meet before a federal
court will hear the case. 49 Some of these requirements are said to
be derived from the Court's interpretation of Article III;so in other
words, they are considered constitutional requirements and cannot
42. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) The relevant provision of the APA
states, "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). This
statute was passed because it seemed reasonable that the beneficiaries of a
regulation suffered a 'legal injury" when their legal interests were not
protected by the government because it failed to enforce the regulations or did
so to their detriment. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 184 (discussing how the
legal injury standard served to combat the problem of agency "capture").
43. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 181.
44. Warren Earl Burger was named to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court in 1969. Chief Justice Burger served as Chief Justice
from 1969 until he retired in 1986. The Oyez Project, Justice Warren Burger,
http://www.oyez.org /justices/warren.e-burger. (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
45. Stern, supra note 6, at 1177-81; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 185.
46. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970) (stating that the legal interest" test looked to the merits of the case
and that standing was different analysis). The Court held that this legal
interest may at times be aesthetic, recreational, economic, or even
conservational. Id. at 154.
47. A 'legal interest" was thought to be synonymous with a "legal right""one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortuous
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Tenn. Electric
Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939); Stern, supra note 6,
at 1180-81.
48. Stern, supra note 6, at 1181.
49. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 63.
50. E.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (interpreting the language of
Article III of the Constitution to limit the power of the judiciary to resolve only
"cases" and "controversies"); see also U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
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be overridden by a statute of Congress.5 1
Although the "case or controversy" requirement in Article III
is somewhat ambiguous, the courts are not without guidance.5 2
Over the years, courts have held that the "irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." 53
The three constitutional requirements of standing, which have
been reiterated over and over in the last few decades, are: (1) the
plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) there must be a
causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the conduct of
the defendant complained of, and (3) it must be likely that the
plaintiffs injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the
court. 54
1. Valley Forge: DisregardingPsychologicalInjury

Under the first prong, a plaintiff must have suffered an
injury-in-fact, that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest 5 5
51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 63; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("the core component of standing is an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."); Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that the doctrine of standing has
several self-imposed judicial restraints but that it also has its core component
directly derived from the Constitution).
52. See Lujan, 504 U.S at 560-61 (providing the three modern-day
requirements of standing to be able to sustain a case in federal court);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 63 (enumerating the three constitutional
requirements specified by the Supreme Court a plaintiff must satisfy to have
standing); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 47176) (stating that the Court's extensive body of case law has developed
considerable definitions for the standing concepts).
53. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
54. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts
§ 592 (2009) (stating the three constitutional standing requirements as well as
providing brief case discussions regarding standing and the injury-in-fact
requirement); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 63 (analyzing the three
constitutional standing requirements); Johanna Gnall, Addressing Maryland's
Restrictive Environmental Standing: Maryland's Environmental Standing
Law Must Be Reformed to Allow an Individual to Have Standing to Sue Based
on Aesthetic or Recreational Injury and to Permit an Organization to Have
Standing to Sue on Behalf of a Member Asserting an Aesthetic or Recreational
Injury, 16 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 154 (2009) (laying out and describing the
three requirements); Preston Carter, Note, If an (Endangered)Tree Falls in
the Forest, and No One Is Around . . . ." Resolving the Divergence Between
Standing Requirements and Congressional Intent in Environmental
Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2191, 2196-99 (2009) (providing a

discussion of each constitutional standing requirement); Timothy A. Newman,
Note, Standing to Challenge State and Local Immigration Regulation: How the

Notion of Expressive Injury Can Restore Federal Power Over Immigration, 17
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1215, 1225 (2009) (giving a brief overview of the
constitutional standing requirements).
55. The question often arises as to what sorts of injuries are sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a legally protected interest (injury-in-fact). It seems
clear that injuries to statutory rights, constitutional rights, and common law
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which is (a) concrete and particularized5 6 and (b) actual or
imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."5 7
In Valley Forge, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) acquired control over a tract of surplus
governmental property.5 8 HEW conveyed a seventy-seven acre
tract of this excess government land to the petitioners Valley
Forge Christian College59 for educational purposes.60 The purpose
of this educational institution itself was, as described by
petitioners, "to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to
men and women for Christian service as either ministers or
laymen."61 The respondents Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc. ("Americans United") learned of the
conveyance through a news release and brought suit, claiming
that the conveyance violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 62
The Court rejected the respondent's claims, holding that it
lacked the requisite injury to confer standing because the
respondents "fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered by
them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced

by

observation of conduct with which one disagrees."68 The Court
rights are sufficient for standing. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 70. Besides
these categories, however, there is no formula for determining what injuries
are sufficient to confer standing except to identify the types of injuries that the
Court has deemed sufficient and those that are insufficient. Id.
56. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 755-56 (holding that it was insufficient to
constitute an injury for standing purposes for plaintiffs when they claimed to
be stigmatized by the government's policies). In this case, plaintiffs challenged
tax exemptions given to private schools that discriminated on the basis of race
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Id. at 739-40. In denying standing, the
Court held that an injury such as that being claimed, stigmatic injury, can
only afford a basis for standing to "those persons who are personally denied
equal treatment." Id. at 755 (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 73940 (1984)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (holding that a
plaintiff must allege "specific, concrete facts" to show that he has been
personally harmed); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (stating
that a plaintiff must show facts that he or she is directly and adversely
affected by the challenged action).
57. Whitmore v. Ark., 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
58. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 468.
59. Valley Forge Christian College is a nonprofit educational institution
which is supervised by a religious organization known as the Assemblies of
God. Id.
60. Id.
6 1. Id.
62. Id. at 469.
63. Id. at 485 (second emphasis added). The Court held that this
psychological injury is not sufficient to confer standing under Article III. Id. at
485-86. This case is often deemed as the authority on the rejection of the
psychological injury theory. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 794-95 (Kleinfeld, J.,
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continued, reiterating the need to have a sufficient interest to have
standing to sue in federal court. 64 Valley Forge presents one type of
injury that does not qualify as an injury-in-fact for standing; thus,
it is extremely important in the analysis of Barnes-Wallace.
Under the second prong, the injury-in-fact claimed by the
plaintiff must have a causal connection to the defendants
conduct.65 In other words, the injury must be "traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party before the court."66 The
third constitutional requirement a plaintiff must meet is
redressability. 67 To satisfy this element, a plaintiff must show that
it is likely, as opposed to speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision of the court.6 8
These three constitutional requirements decide the question
of who may sue in federal court.69 It is these requirements (most
notably the injury-in-fact requirement) that will be the focus of the
analysis of the subject case of this Comment. 70
2. Barnes-Wallace: Pavinga New Road for Psychological
Injury?

In Barnes-Wallace, the city of San Diego leased two areas of
public land71 to the Boy Scouts of America ("Boy Scouts") to
dissenting).
64. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 ("[S]tanding is not measured by the
intensity of the litigant's interest [in the alleged violation] or the fervor of his
advocacy."); see Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952) (explaining
that standing is not about whether a party feels very strongly about their
position. It is a determination of whether a party possesses the "requisite ...
interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional
conduct.").
65. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
66. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)); see Allen, 468 U.S. at 757 (holding that the
causation between the IRS's grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
schools and the desegregation of schools is highly speculative and indirect).
67. Sohn, supra note 13, at 730.
68. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Carter, supra note 54, at 2198; see Warth, 422
U.S. at 505-06 (discussing that even if the Court were to invalidate the
challenged zoning ordinances, it was "speculative" that low income housing
would be built and redress the plaintiff's injury).
69. Wankum, supra note 5, at 515.
70. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 784-86 (analyzing the plaintiffs' standing).
71. One area of land is named Camp Balboa and the other is Fiesta Island.
Id. at 781. Camp Balboa offers many different things for the public including
camping, swimming, archery, and a meeting place for community groups.
Brief of Boy Scouts of America and Desert Pacific Council, Boy Scouts of
America, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 22, Barnes-Wallace v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 530 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-55732, 04-56167), 2005
WL 735426 [hereinafter Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants].
Fiesta Island, on the other hand, houses a facility known as the Youth Aquatic
Center, which offers kayaks, canoes, sailboats and rowboats, and classroom
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construct and maintain recreational facilities open to the general
public. 72 The plaintiffs consisted of a lesbian couple and an
agnostic couple who brought suit alleging that the leases of public
land to the Boy Scouts, an organization that excludes people
because of their sexual and religious orientations, violated the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.7 3
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged an injury in that they
avoided the land leased by the Boy Scouts because they felt an
"aversion to the facilities and felt unwelcome there because of the
Boy Scouts' policies that discriminated against people like them."74
The plaintiffs, however, admitted that they had never tried to use
the facilities located in Camp Balboa or on Fiesta Island.75
Additionally, there is no evidence that the Boy Scouts ever turned
away any non-Scout group at either facility.76
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
had alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact because they wanted to use
the facilities, but they avoided doing so because they were
"offended by the Boy Scouts exclusion . . . of lesbians, atheists and

agnostics." 77 In essence, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs'
offense to the policies of the Boy Scouts (a psychological injury) to
show a sufficient injury-in-fact to challenge its leases with the
city.78
III. ANALYSIS

It is important to analyze the holding of the Barnes-Wallace
case79 to understand its present and future implications on
standing doctrine.
space for community groups. Id. at 21. Both Camp Balboa and the Youth
Aquatic Center are offered for use on a first-come, first-served basis to Boy
Scouts and the public alike, and no group is denied use of the grounds for any
reason other than a pre-existing reservation. Id.
72. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 781-82; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 2,
Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2005), (Nos. 0455732, 04-56167), 2005 WL 735427.
73. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 780, 783.
74. Id. at 783.
75. Id. at 782.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 784. In finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court
distinguished the Valley Forge case based on the fact that plaintiffs in this
case said that they would like to use the land but avoided doing so, whereas in
Valley Forge, the plaintiffs did not claim to have an interest in using the land.
Id. at 785. The plaintiffs in Valley Forge were offended by the fact that they
believed the Government was endorsing a particular religion by handing over
federal land to a religious institution to use for religious purposes, thereby
violating the Constitution. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.
78. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 785-86.
79. Id. at 784.
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Giant Crosses, Religious Displays, and Boy Scouts?

When alleging violations of the Establishment Clause, issues
of standing usually arise in two categories of cases:80 prayer
cases8 and religious display cases. 82
In the Barnes-Wallace case, the majority analogized the
80. Marc Rohr, Tilting at Crosses: Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the
Establishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495, 498-504 (1995).
81. Prayer cases include those that are challenging prayer in a public
setting such as a public school or a session of a legislature. Newdow v. Bush,
391 F. Supp. 2d 95, 103 (D.D.C. 2005). A few examples of prayer cases, where
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the practices, are: Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (holding that currently enrolled students had established
standing to challenge a prayer that was said at the graduation ceremony) and
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a plaintiff that regularly attended town council meetings where a prayer
was read had standing to challenge it as a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
In Lee v. Weisman, a principal invited a member of the clergy (a rabbi)
to give an invocation and a benediction prayer for the formal graduation
ceremony at the plaintiffs middle school. Lee, 505 U.S. at 581. The Court
found that the prayer at school graduations was essentially a state-sponsored
religious activity. Id. at 587. The plaintiff had standing because the Court
stated that it was likely, if not certain, that a similar invocation and
benediction prayer would be recited at her high school graduation. Id. at 584.
Also, the Court found that the plaintiff had suffered harm because she was
essentially forced to sit through and participate in this violation of the
Establishment Clause, even if she sat and did nothing. Id. at 592.
In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, the plaintiff was a resident of Great
Falls, a member of the Wiccan faith, and a frequent attendee of town council
meetings for many years. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 294. The town council meetings
always opened with a prayer that often referred to Jesus Christ, and it was
the practice of all attending to stand and bow their heads. Id. at 294-95. The
plaintiff moved for an injunction to have the town council members cease and
desist from holding Christian prayers. Id. at 296. The plaintiff was harmed
and found to have standing to challenge the violation of the Establishment
Clause because the prayers invoked and supported a particular religion and
the plaintiff, in order to participate in the meeting, had to sit through the
unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity by her local government. Id. at
301-02.
82. The religious display cases are those where the plaintiffs challenge the
inclusion of a religious display (for example, a cross, menorah, nativity scene,
or other religious statuary) on public property. Newdow, 391 F. Supp. 2d at
103; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005) (allowing the
plaintiff, a resident of Austin, Texas, and frequent visitor to the capitol
grounds, to challenge the placement of a six-foot-high monument upon which
the Ten Commandments were written on the grounds of the capitol); Adland v.
Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 478-79 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the maintaining of a monument of the Ten
Commandments on capitol grounds when the plaintiffs frequently traveled
there on political business); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 299-300
(7th Cir. 2000) (finding standing where plaintiffs who used the municipal
building to participate in government and fulfill legal obligations challenged
the placement of a monument to the Ten Commandments in front of the
municipal building).
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plaintiffs case to cases where an injury-in-fact was recognized,
particularly where a religious display caused a person such
distress that he can no longer enjoy the land where the display is
located. 83 The majority first compared the plaintiffs' case to Buono
v. Norton.84 In Buono, the plaintiff was offended by the
"establishment" of a cross on federal parkland85 Indeed, the
plaintiff was so offended that he avoided passing through or
visiting the land.86 The court held that plaintiffs who were
"offended by religious displays on government property" had

standing to challenge them.87
The majority in Barnes-Wallace also compared the case to
Ellis v. City of La Mesa.88 In Ellis, the plaintiffs8 9 alleged that they
were "deeply offended" by the fact that a cross was displayed on
public property.90 Additionally, all of the plaintiffs alleged that
they avoided using the land upon which the crosses were displayed
because they were offended by them.9 ' The court held that the
plaintiffs had suffered an injury-in-fact because they avoided the
public land on which the crosses were displayed. 92
The majority in Barnes-Wallace attempted to compare these
cases-where a blatant religious display of a giant cross creates so
much revulsion and offense to the plaintiffs that they avoid the
land-to the facts before it, where the plaintiffs avoided the land
because of their offense at the presence of the Boy Scouts on the
83. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 784.
84. Id.; Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 543-50 (9th Cir. 2004).
85. Buono, 371 F.3d at 544. This case involved a Latin cross that was
erected in the Mojave National Park, which is managed by the National Park
Service. Id. The district court had established that a Latin cross was the
"preeminent symbol of Christianity. It is exclusively a Christian symbol, and
not a symbol of any other religion." Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202,
1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
86. Buono, 371 F.3d at 546. The plaintiff was a practicing Roman Catholic
and did not find the cross itself objectionable. Id. What the plaintiff did find
objectionable was that a cross was located on federal land to the exclusion of
other religions' symbols. Id.
87. Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
88. Id.; see generally Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
89. John Murphy was the plaintiff challenging the Mount Helix cross, and
Philip K. Paulson with Howard T. Kreisner were the plaintiffs challenging the
Mount Soledad cross. Id. at 1523.
90. Id. In this case, two separate crosses were displayed on public land: the
Mount Helix cross and the Mount Soledad cross. Id. at 1520. The Mount Helix
cross was a thirty-six-foot cross located near the top of Mount Helix and was
illuminated every night of the year. Id. at 1520-21. The Mount Soledad cross
was a forty-three-foot cross located near the top of Mount Soledad, although
not illuminated at night. Id. at 1521.
91. Id. at 1523. Plaintiff Murphy claimed that he would visit the theatre to
enjoy the view, but avoided it because of the cross. Id. Plaintiffs Paulson and
Kreisner claimed that they too would like to enjoy the view from atop Mount
Soledad but refused to do so because of the cross's dominance. Id.
92. Id.
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land.9 3 Nevertheless, the cases cannot be reconciled with each
other based simply on their respective facts.94
As other circuits have recognized, religious display and cross
cases occupy a special place in standing jurisprudence.9 5 Courts
have held that, in these cases, the type of "injury that gives
standing to plaintiffs . . . is that caused by unwelcome direct

contact with a religious display that appears to be endorsed by the
state."9 6 Courts have articulated that the reason religious display
cases occupy a special corner is because, in these types of cases,
the government "actively and directly communicat[es] a religious
message through religious words or religious symbols-in other
words, it ... engage[es] in religious speech that [is] observed, read,
or heard by the plaintiffs . . . .".9 This direct contact with a
religious display creates a specific type of injury to a plaintiff
different from a citizen's generalized grievance against the
government for an alleged violation of the Constitution.9 8 It follows
that the plaintiffs in Buono and Ellis had standing because each
suffered a personal injury due to his or her direct contact with the
religious displays on government property.99
In Barnes-Wallace, the plaintiffs were offended by the
exclusion and disapproval of lesbians and atheists by the Boy
Scouts.1 00 Also, because the Boy Scouts leased public parkland
from San Diego, the plaintiffs avoided the land due to their
93. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 784; see also Barnes-Wallace v. City of San
Diego, 551 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting)

(dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc concerning the standing issue).
94. Barnes-Wallace, 551 F.3d at 896 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (citing Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir.
1997) ("Religious display cases are an even more particularized subclass of
Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence.")). In Suhre, at issue was a
display of the Ten Commandments in the main courtroom of the Haywood
County courthouse. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1084. The plaintiff was an atheist who
had been involved in several legal proceedings and other meetings in the
courtroom where he came into direct contact with the Ten Commandments
display. Id. at 1085. The plaintiff claimed that he was revolted and offended by
the display of the Ten Commandments and feared that it influenced juries to
make decisions based on religious concepts instead of the law. Id.; see also
Pamela D. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1351-52
(2001) (explaining that, generally, when the harm is the type suffered by
citizens for the failure of government to adhere to the Constitution and laws, it
is not sufficient to be a judicially cognizable injury except when dealing with
Establishment Clause violations).
96. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086.
97. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
98. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. Essentially, direct contact with the religious
display takes the injury out of the realm of a generalized grievance-like that
asserted by the plaintiffs in Valley Forge-and shows a personal effect on the
plaintiff sufficient to show an injury-in-fact. Id.
99. Buono, 371 F.3d at 544-48; Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1523.
100. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 784.
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revulsion of the Boy Scouts and its policies.101 The Ninth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs' avoidance of public land because of their
revulsion toward the Boy Scouts created an injury-in-fact
sufficient to confer standing to them.102
But in order for the majority's comparison to work, and for
the plaintiffs' psychological injuries to be sufficient, the Boy Scouts
must be characterized as a "religious display on government
property."103 The activities and/or presence of a group of Boy
Scouts cannot be believed to constitute a "religious display on
government property."104
For one, the Boy Scouts as a group have been characterized
by many courts to specifically not be a religious organization.10 5 To
be sure, there is a religious component to the Boy Scouts. 06
Specifically, a Scout must profess to believe in God and agree "to
do [his] duty to God . . . ."1o Nevertheless, these small religious
components do not make the Boy Scouts a religious institution.108
101. Id.
102. Id. at 785.
103. Buono, 371 F.3d at 548. The court stated that the plaintiffs injury in
Buono-his "inability to unreservedly use public land"-created an injury-infact because his avoidance of the land and the cross on that land was a
personal injury suffered "as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error."
Id. at 546-47 (emphasis omitted). The court in Barnes-Wallace then compared
the plaintiffs refusal to go on the land leased by the Boy Scouts in that case as
a similar injury sufficient to confer standing. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 784.
Nevertheless, the two cases do not mesh. Applying the holdings from the
religious display cases to this case-where there is no giant cross-is an
erroneous extension of psychological injury that, in turn, is sufficient to create
an injury-in-fact. Id. at 796 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
104. Barnes-Wallace, 551 F.3d at 897 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting); see also
Buono, 371 F.3d at 547-48 (finding large crosses to be religious displays on
public property).
105. See Powell v. Bunn, 59 P.3d 559, 580 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
the activities of the Boy Scouts are primarily secular, that is, social and
recreational). The court in Powell continued by saying that there definitely is a
religious component to the Boy Scouts: "a scout must profess to believe in God
and must take an oath to do his duty to God . . . . But a Scouts' religious

beliefs-both their strength and their substance-are left to him and his
family; any exploration of them is done individually and voluntarily." Id.; see
also Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159-60
(N.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (stating that scouting is mainly
secular in nature); Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of the City of
LaDue, 859 F. Supp 1239, 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1993), rev'd, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1994) (stating that the Boy Scouts, being a secular organization, have a
primary purpose of developing "skills and moral character not related to any
religious faith").
106. Charter and Bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America art. IX, § 1, July 2007,
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/8919588/Charter-and-Bylaws-of-t heBoy-Scouts-of-America.
107. Id.
108. E.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1217 n.10 (N.J. 1999),
rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (the fact "[tihat Boy Scouts' oath expresses a belief
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Additionally, there were no religious displays whatsoever in either
Camp Balboa or Fiesta Island. 09 There were neither giant crosses
nor any other items of religious significance at the Youth Aquatic
Center on Fiesta Island or in Camp Balboa.110 As Judge Kleinfeld
noted in his dissent, "[N]either a Boy Scout, the Boy Scout emblem
(an eagle with a shield on a fleur-de-lis), nor a sign saying 'Boy
Scouts' is the central symbol of any religion or sexual
preference."111
Second, in observing the offending objects in Barnes-Wallace,
Buono, and Ellis, it is quite obvious that there is a significant
difference between them. 112 Judge Kleinfeld's dissent, although
simple at first glance, is precisely on point. 113 Judge Kleinfeld
states that a "gigantic cross on a mountaintop carries religious
significance that a herd of eleven-year-old boys camping out and
swimming does not."114 The religious display cases were not
applicable to Barnes-Wallace because there was no religious
display causing the plaintiffs psychological injury. 115
B. The Present and FutureImplications of the Barnes-Wallace
Decision on StandingDoctrine
The decision by the majority in this case has had collateral
consequences. 116 In the Ninth Circuit, at least one district court
has already cited the majority's ruling on standing as binding
precedent." 7 In Trunk v. City of San Diego, the issue was the
Mount Soledad cross located just outside of San Diego,

in God does not make it a religious institution."); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as
a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 768 (1984) ("A simple
requirement that members believe in God would not alone make an
organization religious . . . .").
109. Barnes-Wallace, 551 F.3d at 897 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting); Brief of
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 71, at 47-48. In fact, the
only items that the plaintiffs identified as offending on either property were
two small "Scout chapel" signs in Camp Balboa. Brief of DefendantsAppellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 71, at 47-48. Nevertheless, the signs
complained of were removed three years before the case came before the court
to make room for a climbing wall for the public to use. Id.
110. Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Apellants, supra note 71, at 47.
111. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 797 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
112. Barnes-Wallace, 551 F.3d at 897 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing
Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 797 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)).
113. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 797 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 796.
116. Barnes-Wallace,551 F.3d at 893 n.2 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
117. Id.; Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (S.D. Cal.
2008), rev'd, Nos. 08-56415, 08-56436, 2011 WL 9636 (9th Cir. 2011). The
Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that the monument did not violate the
Establishment Clause, not on the issue of standing. Trunk, 2011 WL 9636, at
*23.
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California. 18 There, one of the plaintiffs, Trunk, claimed that he
had suffered an injury-in-fact because he was offended by the
memorial. 19 Trunk was offended by the memorial cross because he
believed it "sends a message that only Christian War Veterans are
being honored or remembered."120 Because of the memorial cross,
Trunk said that he did not enjoy the memorial or the land where it
is located.121
In deciding whether the plaintiffs had standing, the court
stated, "If Plaintiffs' claims were based on any theory other than
violation of the Establishment Clause, they would likely be out of
court for lack of standing."122 The court continued by saying that
"[i]n the Ninth Circuit ... merely being ideologically offended, and
therefore reluctant to visit public land where a perceived
Establishment Clause violation is occurring, suffices to establish
'injury in fact."1 23 The fact that lower courts are citing to this case
as precedent for psychological injury is contradicting wellestablished precedent set forth by the United States Supreme
Court.124 Justice Rehnquistl 25 delivered the opinion that expressly
and clearly indicated that psychological injury that is inflicted by
118. Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. This is one of the same memorials at
issue in Ellis v. City of La Mesa. Id. The cross is located a few miles from
downtown San Diego. Id. The cross was officially dedicated as a memorial to
fallen veterans of World War I and II as well as to those fallen in the Korean
War in 1954, but a cross has been in existence there since 1913. Id. at 1203.
Since then, visitors to the hill come both to see the memorial and also to take
in the panoramic view from the hilltop. Id. at 1202. In 2006, Congress
exercised its takings power to preserve the cross as a national memorial and
acquire the property as federal land. Id. at 1204; Act of Aug. 14, 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-272, 120 Stat. 770, 770-72 (2006).
119. Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 784-85 (majority opinion)).
124. Over twenty-five years ago, in 1982, the Supreme Court decided Valley
Forge. 454 U.S. 464. That decision continues to be a valid precedent to this day
and has not been overruled.
125. William Rehnquist served as an associate justice on the United States
Supreme Court from 1971 through 1986. The Oyez Project, Justice William H.
Rehnquist, http://www.oyez.org/justices/williamh-rehnquist (last visited Apr.
5, 2011). Justice Rehnquist was nominated in 1971 by President Nixon and
was a staunch conservative, often holding out as a lone dissenter from the
liberal majority during his early years. Id. This was not the case in Valley
Forge, where Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority against recognizing
psychological injury "produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees" as a sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing. Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 485. Four years after the decision in Valley Forge, Justice Rehnquist
was nominated to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Oyez
Project, Justice William H. Rehnquist, http://www.oyez.org/justices/william_h_
rehnquist (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). He served as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court from 1986 until he died in 2005. Id.
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the "observation of conduct with which one disagrees" is not a
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing.126
This type of injury is precisely what the plaintiffs in BarnesWallace alleged to have suffered:127 injury due to their observation
of the Boy Scouts management of their facilities (built and
maintained by the Boy Scouts, no less) located on public land. 128
The Boy Scouts' management of the facilities offends and revolts
the plaintiffs because the Boy Scouts have beliefs different from
their own and disapprove of people like the plaintiffs.129 Because of
the plaintiffs' own disapproval of the Boy Scouts' beliefs, the
plaintiffs chose to avoid the land leased by the Boy Scouts. 130 But
the choice to avoid public land because of revulsion at others'
beliefs does not, and should not, confer standing.' 3'
Additionally, to confer standing to plaintiffs who disagree or
are offended by the beliefs of other groups that lease and use
public land could lead to an unending parade of lawsuits.132
Consider the example of a person with anti-homosexual beliefs
who claims that his daughter cannot attend school fairs because
the school's Lesbian and Gay Alliance have a booth at the fair and
he is offended by them. 3 3 Or consider an anti-Christian person
who refuses to use a public train station because part of it is
leased to a Christian bookstore and he cannot stand to be around
it.14 By the reasoning of the majority, this avoidance motivated by
the offense at others' beliefs (psychological injury) allows plaintiffs
to exclude those groups from the public facility, similar to how the
plaintiffs in Barnes-Wallace want the Boy Scouts off the public
126. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (holding that the plaintiffs "fail to identify
any personal injury ... other than the psychological consequence presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an
injury sufficient to confer standing under Article III. . .
127. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 784.
128. Id.
129. Id. Although the Boy Scouts disapprove of lesbians, atheists, and
agnostics, they did not exclude anyone from using the facilities located on the
land at either Camp Balboa or Fiesta Island. Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1282 (S.D. Cal. 2003) ("Plaintiffs point to no
evidence that the [Boy Scouts organization] has discriminated against any
individual in violation of [the leases].").
130. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 784.
131. Id. at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("A feeling of revulsion for others
who have different beliefs, so strong that one feels degraded or excluded if
they are present, does not confer standing.").
132. See Brief for American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 20, Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 530 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-55732, 04-56167), 2005 WL 925931
[hereinafter Brief for American Civil Rights Union] ("Standing requirements .
. . are meant to prevent parties from bringing to the courts purely
philosophical arguments .... That is exactly the case here . . .
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id.
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parkland leased to them.13 5
The dissent states that by allowing the Barnes-Wallace
plaintiffs' revulsion and consequent avoidance of the land
managed by the Boy Scouts to confer standing, "we assist in a
campaign to destroy by litigation an association of people because
of their viewpoints."136 By recognizing the plaintiffs' psychological
injury as a sufficient injury-in-fact, the majority has undermined
the Boy Scouts' constitutional right to gather and reinforce the
values they share.'37 Judge Kleinfeld articulated it best in the
following excerpt:
San Diego, like many municipalities, leases property to many nonprofit groups: San Diego Calvary Korean Church, Point Loma
Community Presbyterian Church, the Jewish Community Center,
the Vietnamese Federation, the Black Police Officers Association,
and ElderHelp. No doubt people can be found in San Diego who do
not like Koreans, Presbyterians, Jews, Vietnamese, Blacks, and old
people, and who disagree with the beliefs people in these groups
share. Their feelings of disagreement or dislike should not be
treated as the "concrete injury" that is "an invasion of a legally
protected interest" required for standing. 138
By handing down this decision, the majority of BarnesWallace has opened the courthouse doors to any and all who claim
to be offended by the management and use of public land by
groups having differing beliefs and views.
This decision has already had an impact on the courts, so
there is reason to believe it will continue.139 The future
implications could be disastrous for the courts because not only
does this decision directly contradict valid precedent,140 it is also
counterintuitive to the functions of standing. 141 While the future
implications cannot be ascertained yet, it is reasonable to predict
that the doctrine of standing will become even more amorphous
than before.142
135. Id. at 16-17.
136. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
137. Id.; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding
that the Boy Scouts enjoy the constitutional right of freedom of expressive
association and are, therefore, not required to allow homosexual members into
their group); Brief for American Civil Rights Union, supra note 132, at 3-4
(explaining that the Boy Scouts should not be penalized for exercising their
constitutional right to exclude certain people from their organization).
138. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 797 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
139. Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
140. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.
141. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 61-62 (listing as two functions of
standing "restricting the availability of judicial review" and "preventing a
flood of lawsuits by those who have only an ideological stake in the outcome.").
142. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (citing Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th
Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund)).
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IV. PROPOSAL

At issue throughout this Comment has been whether
"psychological injury" should suffice to show an "injury-in-fact" in
order to confer standing. It should not, except in the very select
group of religious display and prayer cases, which must be
narrowly construed.143 Thus, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari and overturn the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego.144 The majority in

Barnes-Wallace has strayed much too far from the precedent set
45
and the Supreme Court should take the
forth in Valley Forge,1
case to reaffirm that precedent as well as to clarify that mere
offense at others' beliefs will not suffice as an "injury-in-fact."146
In this way, the Supreme Court would create consistency in
what has become an area of law that has not always been clear or
easily discernible.4 7 The question of who is able to bring a suit in
federal court became clearer with the establishment of the
constitutional test in Lujan;148 but what types of injuries present a
cognizable injury-in-fact is a question that has not always been
answered consistently, as evidenced by the case at issue in this
Comment. 49 Throughout history, the Court has adhered to the
belief that injuries of the flesh and injuries of the purse suffice to

143. See supra notes 81-82, 95-99 and accompanying text.
144. Judge Kleinfeld's dissent in the original case as well as Judge
O'Scannlain's dissent in the Ninth Circuit's refusal to rehear the case en banc
opined that the majority had erred in reversing themselves and granting
standing to the plaintiffs. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 794-99; BarnesWallace, 551 F.3d at 891-98.

145. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485. Once again, the United States Supreme
Court's precedent states that "the psychological consequence ... produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees" is not an injury sufficient to
grant standing under Article III. Id.
146. Barnes-Wallace,530 F.3d at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("By treating
the Barnes-Wallaces and the Breens revulsion for Boy Scouts and consequent
avoidance of a place the Boy Scouts manage as conferring standing, we extend
standing to a claim that precedent does not support."); Barnes-Wallace, 551
F.3d at 895 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ("By stretching the definition of an
injury-in-fact beyond the breaking point to include injuries-in-theory, the
majority's opinion is also inconsistent with longstanding Supreme Court
precedent.").
147. Barnes-Wallace,551 F.3d at 898.

148. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Lujan established the three constitutional
requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to bring suit in federal
court. Id. Those three requirements are an injury-in-fact, causal connection
between the injury and the defendant's conduct complained of, and the
likelihood that the court will redress the injury sustained with a favorable
decision. Id.
149. See Wankum, supra note 5, at 562-64 (discussing the confusion caused
by permitting taxpayer suits under the Establishment Clause and advocating
for the application of the Lujan test to them).
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allow a party to bring suit.1 5 0 But the problem with suits like the
one at issue here is, like with taxpayer suits, the nature of the
supposed injury-an injury where it is impossible to show a
particular harm besides the plaintiffs "psychological displeasure
with the results of a governmental action."151
Acknowledging a plaintiffs "psychological injury" may be
asking no more of the courts than what they already do in other
contexts. 152 One such context, for instance, is the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 153 A cause of action for
emotional distress is recognized by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and it does not require a plaintiff to show a tangible injury
in order to bring suit or recover damages from a defendant.154 The
existence of causes of action where purely emotional harms are
considered and redressed should enable courts to treat
psychological harm analogously-such as the plaintiffs offense
and revulsion in Barnes-Wallace-and grant standing to those
plaintiffs too; is that not a reasonable inference? 5 5 Perhaps, but
many believe that this is not reasonable; nor is it wise to allow this
type of emotional injury to qualify as a cognizable injury-in-fact.156
The injury recognized by the courts as cognizable in the tort
of emotional distress stands as a stark exception to the common
law.157 Because of the judiciary's reluctance to recognize emotional
harm as cognizable, the burden to establish a claim for emotional
distress is rigorous.18 In order to state a claim for emotional
distress, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant caused
severe emotional distress (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) by the
defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct.159 To meet these
strenuous requirements and demonstrate that conduct is extreme
and outrageous, courts seem to agree that the conduct causing the
psychological harm has to be "utterly intolerable" and "go[ beyond
all bounds of civilized society." 60 Additionally, a plaintiff must
150. Id. at 563. Actions involving money damages and those that involved
punishment and/or imprisonment have been around since before the United
States was founded. Id.
151. Id.
152. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18
J.L. & POL. 499, 526 (2002). While this Comment is concerned primarily with
the endorsement test, the reasoning could very easily be applied to
psychological injury being insufficient to show a cognizable injury-in-fact.
153. Id.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).

155. Choper, supra note 152, at 526.
156. Id. at 529-30.
157. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 822 (2000)) ("It is certainly

true that on the whole, courts have been extremely cautious in allowing claims
for. . . emotional harm.").
158. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46).
159. DOBBS, supra note 157, at 826.
160. Choper, supra note 152, at 526 (quoting DOBBS, supra note 157, at 827).
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show that the distress caused to him by the defendant's
misconduct is so severe that "no reasonable person should be
expected to endure it."161

Under these stringent requirements, although a defendant
may have intentionally inflicted offense or humiliation on a
person, he may still escape liability because it does not rise to the
level of outrageous conduct or cause severe enough distress to the
plaintiff. 162 On the other hand, the decision of the majority in
Barnes-Wallace would allow a plaintiff to bring suit against a
defendant based on conduct that is neither outrageous nor
intended to cause offense or humiliation to another person.16 3 The
fact that the judiciary has been quite cautious in allowing
emotional distress torts and has developed stringent requirements
to further narrow the availability of such torts counsels against
broadening the view of psychological harm as sufficient to create a
cognizable injury-in-fact;164 but the majority in Barnes-Wallace has
chosen to take the exact opposite course, contradicting longstanding precedent.
Finally, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order to
preserve and strengthen the functions and values served by a
limited standing doctrine.165 Standing is the instrumentality in
determining whether the person bringing suit is the proper party
As a little background, typically, a court will find outrage based upon the
degree of misconduct and the relationship shared between the parties. DOBBS,
supra note 157, at 827. There are four specific situations that usually support
a finding of outrage: (1) when the defendant is using a position of dominance
to abuse his power or position; (2) when the defendant is intentionally
emotionally harming or taking advantage of a plaintiff known to him to be
especially vulnerable; (3) when a defendant repeats acts that are merely
offensive and can be tolerated when done once, and the plaintiff cannot avoid
the defendant's behavior; and (4) when a defendant commits physical violence
or threatens serious economic harm to a plaintiff known to have a special
interest. Id.
161. Choper, supra note 152, at 526 (quoting DOBBS, supra note 157, at 832).
162. Choper, supra note 152, at 526-27. For example, plaintiffs who suffer
indignities, insults, or annoyance are usually unable to show that the
defendant's conduct was outrageous. DOBBS, supra note 157, at 826.
Additionally, being given an unfair evaluation and subsequently being
discharged from employment may be humiliating to an employee; and
although the evaluation may be offensive, this offense and humiliation are not
actionable. Id.
163. The purpose of the leases granted to the Boy Scouts by the city of San
Diego was to develop "cultural, educational, and recreational programs" on the
city property for the entire public community. Barnes-Wallace, 530 F.3d at 781
(majority opinion). Leasing the properties to the Boy Scouts of America was
never meant to cause offense to the plaintiffs, but it was merely a way to meet
the city's legitimate goal of establishing recreational facilities for the public on
public land. Id.
164. Choper, supra note 152, at 527.
165. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 61-62 (citing four different values
served by having a limited standing doctrine).
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to bring the matter before the court, and there are several values
served by limiting who can bring suit in federal court.166 First,
standing doctrine promotes the separation of powers between the
branches of government.167 By restricting who may bring suit,
standing is deemed to "limit[] what matters the judiciary will
address and minimize[ judicial review of the actions of the other
16
Another value served by the limiting
branches of government."e
function of standing doctrine, particularly important in BarnesWallace, is its promotion of judicial efficiency. 69 The standing
doctrine prevents a "flood of lawsuits by those who have only an
ideological stake in the outcome."o7 0 It is especially this value that
is disregarded by the Ninth Circuit in Barnes-Wallace. As a
subsequent district court stated regarding the majority's opinion,
"[i]n the Ninth Circuit, . . . merely being ideologically offended,

and therefore reluctant to visit public land where a perceived
Establishment Clause violation is occurring, suffices to establish
'injury in fact."'171
It is a ruling like the one in Barnes-Wallace, which strays
from binding precedent while trying to distinguish itself, that
leaves courts unable to apply the law of standing consistently. 72
166. Id. at 60-61.
167. Id. at 61; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separationof Powers Doctrine, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881
(1983). Then-Judge Scalia stated that standing serves to limit the role of the
judicial branch of government and prevent it from encroaching upon the
democratic process of the legislative and executive branches. Scalia, supra, at
894.
Professor Chemerinsky gives other values that are promoted by limiting
the doctrine of standing. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 61-62. One of these
values is the ability to "improve judicial decision making by ensuring that
there is a specific controversy before the court" and that the person arguing
before it has an adequate personal stake in the matter to litigate it effectively.
Id. at 62. This value is said to "sharpen[] the presentation of issues" that the
court "depends [on] for illumination of difficult constitutional issues." Id.
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
Another value of standing is the promotion of fairness by "ensuring that
people will raise only their own rights and concerns ... ." Id. The Court said
this value is important because the rights of others should not be considered
by the courts unnecessarily, especially when the holders of those rights do not
even want the courts to rule on them. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14
(1976). For more explanation on how this value is served by standing, see
Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 306-10 (explaining in more detail the fairness
value or "representation" perspective). Although these values are thought to
be best served by a limited standing doctrine, the issue of this Comment is
affected by these values only marginally.
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 61.

169. Id.
170. Id. (citing U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).

171. Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
172. E.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 ("The absence of precise definitions . . .
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The Supreme Court seems to believe that the doctrine of standing
has been sufficiently defined by developing case law and that "the
question of standing can be answered chiefly by comparing the
allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior
standing cases." 73 While this may be true in some or even many
cases, standing and the requirement of an injury-in-fact are not
always easily discernible. 174 Because of this, the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari not only to correct a misapplication of
standing doctrine, but to attempt to clear up some of the confusion
surrounding it. The Supreme Court must clarify that
"psychological injury," especially in regard to the offense and
revulsion one feels at another's beliefs, will never be sufficient to
confer standing.
V. CONCLUSION

While there is a debate on whether standing has historical
roots, it seems the modern test is here to stay. The Court can
provide needed guidance to lower courts and give credence to the
functions of standing by accepting this case and ruling that
"psychological injury" is not a sufficient injury-in-fact. Consistency
is what is needed in the application of standing doctrine, and this
case could go far in providing it.

hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the law of standing."). Although the
Supreme Court seems to believe this conclusion, it is clear from the majority's
decision in Barnes-Wallace that the Ninth Circuit does not.
173. Id. at 751-52.
174. Barnes-Wallace, 551 F.3d at 898.

